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A RADICALLY IMMODEST JUDICIAL 
MODESTY: 
THE END OF FACIAL CHALLENGES TO 
ABORTION REGULATIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE HEALTH EXCEPTION 
IN THE ROBERTS ERA 
B. Jessie Hill† 
“This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
If there is anything as strongly associated in the public mind with 
Chief Justice John Roberts as his black robe and judicial  
temperament, it is surely his claim to judicial modesty. In his  
confirmation hearings, the Chief Justice expressed his desire “to be 
known as a modest judge,” and several witnesses testified that he 
exhibited such humility.2 Of course, it is still early to assess whether 
 
† Associate Professor and Associate Director, Center for Social Justice, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Justine Konicki for her extraordinarily 
helpful research assistance. 
1 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 474 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J. 
concurring in the judgment). 
2 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter 
Roberts Confirmation Hearing]; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Modesty and 
Abortion, 59 S.C. L. REV. 701, 703 (2008) (suggesting that the Roberts Court’s two abortion 
decisions “appear to foreshadow greater judicial restraint when reviewing abortion-related 
legislation”); Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1253–56 (2008) (discussing the claims about Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial 
modesty, specifically in the form of his respect for precedent); Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of 
Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some 
Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (2008) (“On 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658436
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the Chief Justice, and the Supreme Court as a whole, have followed 
the Chief Justice’s professed imperative. But some commentators 
have already begun to suggest that, at least so far, there are signs of 
newfound judicial restraint in the Roberts Court.3 One example is the 
Roberts Court’s expressed preference for narrower, as-applied 
decisionmaking in constitutional cases, as opposed to striking down 
statutes on their face. 
And indeed, the Supreme Court has turned away facial challenges 
or otherwise expressed a preference for making decisions on an  
as-applied basis in a number of cases since Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the body.4 Examples range across a wide spectrum of subject 
matter, including voting rights cases,5 an Americans with Disabilities 
Act case,6 and—somewhat more surprisingly, given the Supreme 
Court’s traditional solicitude for facial challenges in these contexts—
First Amendment and abortion cases.7 Of course, if this series of 
Roberts Court cases indicates a trend, it is not an entirely new one. At 
least since United States v. Salerno,8 the 1987 case in which the Court 
seemingly held that a statute should not be struck down on its face 
unless “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid,”9 and arguably for some time before that, the Supreme Court 
has expressed a preference for as-applied adjudication.10  
 
 
a number of occasions, Chief Justice Roberts has expressed a strong desire for the Court to 
decide cases narrowly and unanimously.”); cf. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra, at 55 
(asserting that judges should act with “a certain humility”). 
3 See, e.g., Collett, supra note 2, at 703 (noting a growing sense of judicial restraint in 
abortion-related cases); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: 
Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 
1735, 1756–57 (2006) (noting the Roberts Court’s favoritism toward as-applied challenges 
across a broad range of cases). 
4 Other commentators have remarked upon this phenomenon as well. See, e.g., Hartnett, 
supra note 3, at 1756–57; Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the 
Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 (2009). A recent issue of the Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly is dedicated to facial challenges and the Roberts Court. 
5 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).  
6 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). 
7 Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); cf. Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006). Both 
Ayotte and United States v. Georgia were decided after Chief Justice Roberts had joined the 
Court but before Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor in early 2006. 
8 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
9 Id. at 745; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (holding, in a 
First Amendment case, that because “facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our 
traditional rules of practice,” such challenges should succeed only when the overbreadth is “not 
only . . . real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep”). There is some debate over whether the Salerno Court’s language was ever meant to be 
taken at face value. Compare Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175–76 (1996) 
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But perhaps one of the most radical and important instances of the 
Court’s rejection of a facial challenge was in Gonzales v. Carhart,11 
the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban case. The Court’s decision in 
that case was highly unsettling with respect to prior precedent. It 
upheld a criminal abortion statute that lacked an exception for cases 
of medical necessity, despite the fact that the Court had consistently 
emphasized the need for such an exception since Roe v. Wade.12 
Further, the Gonzales decision may have truly sweeping implications 
for the future of substantive abortion doctrine. In this essay, I 
therefore focus specifically on what the Roberts Court did in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, as well as in its predecessor Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of Northern New England,13 in order to consider the 
meaning and impact of the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied 
adjudication in one specific area—abortion jurisprudence. Moreover, 
I evaluate the likely impact of these rulings in light of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s expressed preference for judicially modest rulings. 
Of course, the expression “judicial modesty,” like its opposite 
“judicial activism,” is a term that can mean many things to many  
people—and consequently may not mean much at all.14 As used in 
connection with Chief Justice Roberts, however, it nonetheless seems 
to have certain definable qualities. It appears to refer to a preference 
for narrow, incremental rulings that do not overstep appropriate  
 
 
(mem. of Stevens, J., on denial of cert.) (shedding doubt on the validity of Salerno’s “no set of 
circumstances” language), with id. at 1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) 
(describing the Salerno rule as “a long established principle of our jurisprudence” and asserting 
that it applies even in abortion cases), and Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). See 
generally Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 364 (1998) (arguing that Salerno’s “no set of 
circumstances” language should be understood simply as “a descriptive claim about a statute 
whose terms state an invalid rule of law”).  
10 E.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 
(1912); accord In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 96 (1834) (“[W]hether or not a case 
can be imagined, in which an act of the legislature can be deemed absolutely void, we think it 
quite clear, that when such act is alleged to be void, on the ground that it exceeds the just limits 
of legislative power, and thus injuriously affects the rights of others, it is to be deemed void only 
in respect to those particulars, and as against those persons, whose rights are thus affected.”); 
see also OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 6–8 (Da Capo 
Press 1971) (1935) (discussing the phenomenon of “case-to-case” unconstitutionality or “partial 
unconstitutionality,” which is essentially the same as as-applied unconstitutionality). 
11 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
12 Id. at 168; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (reaffirming the Court’s 
holding in Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey that a health exception is required for both 
previability and postviability abortion regulations).  
13 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
14 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 52 
(2007) (“[J]udicial modesty is no better than judicial activism—they may be political slogans to 
defend decisions with which one agrees or to attack the decisions with which one disagrees.”). 
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judicial bounds or decide unnecessary questions, but rather respect 
the roles of the other branches of government and adhere to 
precedent.15 It is in this sense that I am using the term “judicial 
modesty.” 
Using this definition of judicial modesty, I argue that Ayotte and 
Gonzales, which on their surface appear to indicate a preference for 
modest, narrow rulings, are anything but modest in their implications. 
These decisions call for federal judges to re-write legislation and to 
make judgments in areas in which they have little expertise. They 
thus assure continuing federal court involvement in micro-legislating 
the scope of abortion rights. In addition, I argue that the holdings in  
Gonzales and Ayotte, which ostensibly turn on the appropriateness of 
facial challenges, are really about re-shaping the underlying  
substantive constitutional law pertaining to abortion rights. As such, 
they represent an instance of the remedial tail wagging the substantive 
dog—a case of the proper remedy, as determined by the Supreme 
Court, shaping the underlying right. In this sense, these cases form a 
stark contrast with prior judicial practice, in which the availability of 
facial invalidation depended at least in part on the nature of the  
underlying substantive constitutional doctrine, rather than vice 
versa.16 Thus, although on the surface, the procedural aspects of 
Gonzales and Ayotte raise concerns about the effect on plaintiffs’ 
access to courts to challenge abortion statutes, perhaps the more 
important and far-reaching concern is how they will affect the future 
nature of the abortion right itself. 
In Part I of this essay, I set forth the difference between facial and 
as-applied challenges and briefly summarize the scholarship  
concerning the availability of facial challenges. I also note the  
relationship between the facial/as-applied distinction and other  
concepts such as standing, severability, and remedies, and I discuss 
the history of facial challenges in the abortion context specifically. In 
Part II, I describe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ayotte and  
Gonzales. Finally, in Part III, I explain why the Roberts Court’s stated 
preference for as-applied challenges, at least as it has been  
presented in the abortion cases, does not serve the end of  
judicial modesty. In fact, those cases have far-reaching implications 
for substantive abortion doctrine and promise to continue to  
 
15 Id. at 37–38; see also Cross, supra note 2, at 1252.  
16 See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 9, at 438-51 (explaining how certain doctrinal tests call for 
a remedy of facial invalidation, such as tests forbidding laws enacted with a particular 
legislative purpose; tests forbidding laws with certain content, such as voting restrictions based 
on wealth or laws vesting excessive discretion in executive officials; and tests that “render 
statutes making certain classifications or distinctions presumptively invalid”). 
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embroil the federal courts intimately in future disputes over the  
contours of the abortion right. 
I. FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 
Perhaps the only ground of agreement among scholars and jurists 
with respect to facial and as-applied challenges is that the doctrine is 
hopelessly muddled.17 Debate has centered on the question of when a 
facial challenge may be entertained as well as on the meaning of the 
distinction—if any—itself. This confusion is further intensified by the 
fact that the facial/as-applied distinction intersects and overlaps with 
several other concepts, including standing, severability, and courts’ 
remedial powers. Moreover, there are multiple understandings of the 
purposes behind the distinction and therefore multiple views about the 
issue of when facial challenges should be available. This Part 
nonetheless takes on the daunting task of explaining concisely the 
main features of facial and as-applied challenges and of the scholarly 
debate about their appropriateness. 
A. The Meaning of “Facial” and “As-Applied” Challenges 
A facial challenge is generally understood to be a challenge to a 
law in all its applications; it is also often a claim that a law’s  
unconstitutionality can be determined simply by looking at its  
statutory language, independent of any particular set of facts or  
litigants.18 As-applied challenges, by contrast, involve the assertion 
that a law is unconstitutional only in a specific circumstance or set of 
circumstances, or with respect to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.19 However, even the description of the difference 
 
17 See, e.g.¸ Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Accountable Through Facial 
Challenges, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 563, 569 (2009) (agreeing with one commentator that “the 
‘facial’ and ‘as-applied’ terminology is more confusing than helpful”); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878-80 (2005). 
18 Metzger, supra note 17, at 881. Professor Metzger notes that this definition of facial 
challenges is derived from Salerno, but that prior to Salerno, a broader definition of facial 
challenges was in common use—one that assumed a facial challenge to a statute could 
nonetheless assert unconstitutionality “in a particular range of applications” but still depended 
primarily on the language of the law itself, rather than any particular set of facts. Id. at 881. 
Such challenges may be considered synonymous with overbreadth challenges, although the term 
“overbreadth challenge” usually refers only to those cases in which the unconstitutional 
applications affect persons not before the court. See generally Isserles, supra note 9, at 366 
(describing an overbreadth challenge as one in which “[a] litigant, against whom a particular 
law can be constitutionally applied, argues that because distinct applications of the law to parties 
not before the court would be unconstitutional, the court should facially invalidate the law and 
deem it unenforceable against all parties”). 
19 Again, Professor Metzger distinguishes between the pre-Salerno view of as-applied 
challenges, which “were defined in fairly narrow terms synonymous with claims of privilege,” 
from the broader post-Salerno view, which essentially considers an as-applied challenge to be a 
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between facial and as-applied challenges is subject to dispute. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the principles governing the 
appropriateness and availability of facial challenges can be described 
in any trans-substantive manner; rather, it seems that the shape, 
meaning, and appropriateness of facial and as-applied challenges 
differs depending on the specific constitutional doctrine under which 
a given law is challenged.20 This Part therefore briefly reviews the 
broad contours of the scholarly debate over the meaning and 
appropriateness of facial challenges and notes the relationship of this 
doctrine to other doctrines such as standing, severability, and 
remedies. It then describes the use, meaning, and importance of facial 
challenges in one specific doctrinal context—the abortion context. 
Some scholars have asserted that the very distinction between  
facial and as-applied challenges is meaningless. Professor Richard 
Fallon, for example, claims that every constitutional challenge is  
actually an as-applied challenge because of the longstanding rule that 
“[i]n order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a litigant 
must always assert that the statute’s application to her case violates 
the Constitution.”21 In his view, facial invalidation of a law often  
occurs simply as a consequence of the particular substantive doctrinal 
test applied by the court.22 To the extent that courts appear to  
“invalidate” statutes on their face, however, such invalidation is not 
actually within the power of courts to effect; rather, in the course  
of ruling on an as-applied challenge, a court will often make  
pronouncements that, through the mechanisms of preclusion doctrine 
and stare decisis, have the effect of rendering a law unenforceable—
or at least unenforced—in all its applications.23 
Professor Matthew Adler, by contrast, has argued that all 
constitutional challenges are facial challenges, in the sense that they 
all vindicate a constitutional right against a certain kind of rule.24 
Constitutional law protects individuals against government adoption 
of rules “with the wrong predicate or history”; thus the challenged 
rule is in some sense always judged on its face (for example, in terms 
of its purpose or its mode of drawing classifications) and without 
 
 
claim of partial invalidity. Metzger, supra note 17, at 881. 
20 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 294 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1351, 1369 (2000). 
21 Fallon, Jr., supra note 20, at 1327.  
22 Id. at 1336–39. 
23 Id. at 1339–40. 
24 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American  
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13–34 (1998). 
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reference to the specific facts at hand.25 As a result, he contends that 
the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges is simply a doctrine of 
remedies “and no more than that. It is a doctrine that answers the 
question: Where a rule is constitutionally invalid, should the 
reviewing court repeal the invalid rule, or should the court instead 
amend the rule in some way?”26  
Finally, Professor Michael Dorf argues that “[t]he distinction  
between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it 
illuminates” and that “[i]n some sense, any constitutional challenge to 
a statute is both as-applied,” in the sense that it must be applied to the 
litigant in the case for standing purposes, “and facial,” in the sense 
that “it attacks the statute that authorized the contested government  
action.”27 Thus, he, like Professor Fallon, argues that the “proper  
approach to a constitutional case typically turns on the applicable  
substantive constitutional doctrine,” as well as institutional  
considerations such as whether the court is dealing with a challenge to 
a state or federal statute.28 
As the views of these commentators suggest, the doctrine of facial 
and as-applied challenges intersects and overlaps with several other 
doctrines, including standing, severability, and judicial power to 
shape equitable remedies, as well as the underlying substantive  
constitutional doctrines in the case at hand. For example, the  
availability of facial challenges is considered by some to be an  
exception to traditional standing rules, according to which individuals 
may assert their own rights and injuries but may not raise the rights of 
those who are not before the court.29 In a facial challenge, the litigant 
is almost by definition challenging not only the statute’s application 
to her particular factual circumstances but also the statute’s 
application to everyone else not before the court to whom the statute 
might be applied.30 This is particularly true of so-called 
“overbreadth” challenges—which are most prominent in the First 
 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 Id. at 158. 
27 Dorf, supra note 20, at 294. 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion) 
(“When asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but those 
of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in question. In this sense, the 
threshold for facial challenges is a species of third party (jus tertii) standing, which we have 
recognized as a prudential doctrine and not one mandated by Article III of the Constitution.”); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1984). 
30 But see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3–4 (arguing that 
overbreadth doctrine is more concerned with an individual’s right to be subjected only to 
constitutionally valid rules than with standing to assert the rights of others). 
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context31—whereby even a plaintiff whose conduct could 
constitutionally be proscribed may raise the rights of third parties not 
before the court if the challenged laws impinge on those third parties’ 
rights.32 For this reason, some consider facial challenges to involve a 
species of third-party standing, in which one individual who is injured 
by a law raises the rights of persons not before the court in order to 
achieve invalidation of the law.33 Relatedly, Professor Gene Nichol 
has demonstrated that facial challenges, especially those of the 
preenforcement variety, are often in tension with the related 
justiciability doctrine of ripeness, because no obvious present, 
concrete harm usually exists in such preenforcement situations.34  
In addition, the terms “facial challenges” and “as-app
allenges” appear to refer to something that plaintiffs do on the 
“front end” of a lawsuit—that is, how the lawsuit is pleaded and the 
case argued. Yet several commentators have reached the conclusion 
that the doctrines of facial and as-applied challenges actually have 
just as much or more to do with what happens on the “back end” of 
the suit—that is, in the remedies phase. Thus, Professor Gillian 
Metzger has said that “facial and as-applied challenges are . . . 
differentiated by their effects. A successful facial challenge means 
that the ‘state may not enforce [a statute] under any circumstances . . . 
’; a successful as-applied challenge still allows the state to ‘enforce 
the statute in different circumstances.’”35 In essence, the viability of a 
facial challenge turns on the availability of statutory severance,36 
 
31 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 261; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 195 (5th ed. 2003) (citing 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859 n.29 (1991)); 
Fallon, supra note 20, at 1355–56 (noting that scholars debate whether Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), stands for the proposition that overbreadth challenges are allowed 
“under a uniform standard in all fundamental rights cases”); David L. Franklin, Facial 
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 55 & nn. 67-
68 (2006) (observing that “the Court has sometimes applied a species of overbreadth doctrine” 
in cases other than First Amendment cases, including abortion cases). 
32 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 190–91; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage 
Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 633, 675–76 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception 
to the presumption of separability that normally prevents challenges to a statute on the basis that 
it is unconstitutionally applied to others). 
33 See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n.22. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 
187–95 (describing third-party standing doctrine). But see Monaghan, supra note 29, at 282–86 
(distinguishing overbreadth from third-party standing).  
34 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 164–70 
(1987). 
35 Metzger, supra note 17, at 880–81 (quoting Dorf, supra note 20, at 236) (first alteration 
in original). 
36 Id. at 885–89; Metzger, supra note 4, at 791–92. 
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which in turn often depends on state severability law and 
determinations of a legislature’s intent.37  
B. The Expressed Preference for As-Applied Adjudication 
Despite the widespread availability of facial invalidation in at least 
certain types of cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 
as-applied challenges are to be preferred. This preference has been 
particularly pronounced in the Roberts Court. Thus, the Court has 
pointed out that as-applied challenges serve the interests of judicial 
modesty and separation of powers in many ways, including that  
as-applied challenges do not require courts to interpret statutes 
without a concrete fact scenario;38 they prevent courts from making 
unnecessary constitutional decisions;39 and, by invalidating as little of 
the law as possible, they minimize the degree to which a ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the will of the people as embodied in the 
actions of the legislative branch.40 
At the same time, facial invalidation can serve important purposes. 
Most obviously, facial challenges better protect constitutional rights, 
in that they save individuals from having to go through costly  
and time-consuming litigation to challenge each potentially 
unconstitutional application of a statute.41 By allowing parties to raise 
the rights of others not before the court, they also minimize the  
chilling effect of those statutes on individuals who might be  
 
37 See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (“Severability is of course a 
question of state law”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 506 & n.15 (1985) (noting 
the importance of legislative intent in state and federal severability decisions). 
38 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (“‘[I]t would indeed be 
undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in 
the application of complex and comprehensive legislation.’” (quoting United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)) (alteration in original)). 
39 Cf. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) 
(noting that when the Court uses judicial restraint in a facial challenge, the Court can avoid 
unnecessarily and prematurely deciding a constitutional issue). 
40 Id. at 1191 (“[F]acial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by 
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. We must keep in mind that ‘“[a] ruling of unconstitutionality 
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”’” (quoting Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 
641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)))); cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774 (noting that the Roberts 
Court “has justified its preference for as-applied claims on diverse grounds,” including “the 
current lack of evidence about how a measure will actually operate and the dangers of 
speculative adjudication,” the desire for narrower rulings when a statute is constitutional in most 
of its applications, and perhaps to avoid the applicability of precedent with which the Court 
disagrees). 
41 See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 17, at 593–94 (describing the impracticality of case-
specific as-applied challenges); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
1333, 1334–35 (2005) (discussing the differences between facial and as-applied challenges, 
noting that facial challenges can be more efficient and less costly). 
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unwilling, or simply lack the incentive, to challenge the law  
themselves.42 Moreover, some substantive constitutional doctrines 
seem to mandate facial invalidation, because there is no way to sever 
the unconstitutional parts of a statute. This would be the case with 
respect to laws motivated by an unconstitutional purpose, for 
example, or laws that are vague on their face.43 
C. Facial Challenges in Abortion Jurisprudence 
Facial challenges have long been of central importance in the  
abortion context.44 The seminal abortion case, Roe v. Wade,45 was a 
facial challenge to Texas’s criminal abortion statutes. The  
pseudonymous Jane Roe, the only plaintiff found to have standing, 
was described by the Court as an unmarried, pregnant woman who 
wished to have an abortion but was unable to do so under Texas law, 
because her life was not threatened by the pregnancy and she could 
not afford to travel to a state with more liberal criminal abortion 
laws.46 Yet the Court held the Texas law unconstitutional as applied 
not just to her but in its entirety, and it set out a “trimester” 
framework for abortion regulations that in many respects had nothing 
to do with Jane Roe’s situation.47 For example, the Court held in Roe 
that states could outlaw abortions in the third trimester but had to 
provide exceptions allowing abortions when the woman’s health or 
 
42 See Borgmann, supra note 17, at 597; Gans, supra note 41, at 1353–64 (arguing that 
“courts invalidate statutes on their face to protect absent third parties from the chilling effect 
that results from the threat of sanctions under the challenged statute”). 
43 See Fallon, supra note 20, at 1342–56; Gans, supra note 41, at 1356–87 (discussing 
facial invalidation of vague laws); Isserles, supra note 9, at 387, 400 (discussing “valid rule” 
facial challenges); Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed 
“Purpose,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2569–70 (2006); cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 598–
609 (arguing that facial challenges are particularly appropriate “where legislatures either ignore 
clear constitutional rulings protecting individual rights or where they … base statutes on a 
questionable factual foundation,” in part because such actions may indicate improper legislative 
purpose). 
44 See Borgmann, supra note 17, at 597–98. 
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
46 Id. at 120. Other plaintiffs had joined Roe initially, including a physician who had been 
arrested for violating the Texas laws and a married couple who had been advised to avoid 
childbirth due to the wife’s health problems. Id. at 120-22. Interestingly, Norma McCorvey, the 
individual who sued pseudonymously as Jane Roe, initially asserted to her lawyers that the 
pregnancy was the result of rape, but the attorneys decided not to press this allegation in court, 
partly due to strategic considerations about the sort of relief they wanted to obtain. As Sarah 
Weddington, lead counsel for Jane Roe, explained, “‘[W]e did not want the Texas law changed 
only to allow abortion in cases of rape. We wanted a decision that abortion was covered by the 
right of privacy.’” Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 779, 794 (1996) (quoting SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 52–53 
(1992)). 
47 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN L. REV. 953, 
1078–84 (2005). 
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life was in danger.48 Had the Court not entertained Jane Roe’s claims 
as a facial challenge, it is unclear how she could have had standing to 
challenge the Texas act’s postviability applications. Roe was not 
claiming a medical need for her procedure. She therefore would not 
have been entitled to an injunction prohibiting the law’s enforcement 
in such postviability circumstances if the Court had limited Roe’s 
challenge to the statute as it applied to her.49  
Subsequent to Roe, most challenges to abortion restrictions have 
been brought as facial challenges—often pre-enforcement facial  
challenges—by clinics or individual abortion providers rather than 
individual women seeking abortions.50 Thus, clinics or providers, 
asserting third-party standing to vindicate the rights of the women 
they serve, file suit in advance of the law’s effective date against state 
executive officials charged with criminal enforcement of the laws.51 
Because those providers usually perform an array of abortion 
procedures for various reasons to women in various circumstances 
and at various stages of pregnancy, this litigation structure allows for 
a broad-based attack on criminal abortion statutes. Such laws may be 
attacked as imposing an unconstitutional undue burden on a particular 
class of women, for example; a wide range of evidence may then be 
introduced to demonstrate the effects of the law on particular 
groups.52 Or the laws may be attacked as unconstitutional for lack of 
a health exception, in which case a large amount of scientific 
evidence pertaining to the wide variety of medical conditions 
necessitating an abortion can be introduced.53 The nature of the 
plaintiffs and their claims thus allows a broad range of relevant 
medical and social science evidence to come before the courts, which 
 
48 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.  
49 Roe did purport to sue “on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,” Roe v. 
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 n.1 (D. Tex. 1970), but the Supreme Court did not explore the 
“class aspects” of the case and therefore apparently did not rely on that language when deciding 
the case, Roe, 410 U.S. at 124. 
50 Major abortion cases litigated in this manner include Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007), Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), and 
Thonburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), among 
others. 
51 See sources cited supra note 50. Of course, this litigation posture does not work well for 
laws that simply authorize civil suits against abortion providers rather than criminal sanctions, 
because there is no defendant charged with enforcement of the law and no immediate threat of 
sanctions. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (turning away a 
challenge to such a law). See generally Caitlin Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and 
Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 758–72 (2006) (discussing legislatures’ 
use of tort law to evade constitutional mandates). 
52 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 887–95. 
53 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923–29. 
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in turn permits evaluation of the law’s constitutionality in a broad 
range of circumstances and applica 54
Courts have shown an abiding willingness to accept facial 
challenges in abortion cases since Roe while also finding exceptions 
to traditional rules pertaining to mootness and the prudential bar on 
third-party standing.55 This exceptional treatment of abortion cases is 
justified in large part by the reasons that usually ground courts’  
acceptance of facial challenges. First, if piecemeal litigation by  
individual women were required in every case, it is highly unlikely 
that the underlying constitutional right would be sufficiently 
protected. Due to the inherent time limitations, as well as the 
intensely private nature of the issue, it is unlikely that individual 
women would possess sufficient incentive to go to court to vindicate 
their rights. Although mootness doctrine does not apply to bar suits 
by pregnant women, the likelihood is great that any individual 
plaintiff would be well beyond the time limit for obtaining a 
previability abortion by the time the court issued even preliminary 
relief.56 For this reason, challenges are often instead brought by 
clinics or physicians, who are themselves subject to penalties under 
the challenged abortion laws but who are actually asserting the 
substantive due process rights of their patients. As noted above, this 
litigation structure in turn lends itself to challenging laws in all, or 
virtually all, of their applications.  
Moreover, easy availability of facial challenges in the abortion 
context may be justified by concerns about the chilling effect of the 
abortion restrictions, and in particular those that carry criminal  
penalties. It is fair to surmise that physicians as a whole are a risk-
averse group, and they by and large do not wish to wait until they 
have been criminally prosecuted under a statute to challenge it. If a 
criminal abortion restriction is in place and its enforceability or even 
the extent of its applicability is unclear, there is a danger that 
physicians will steer far clear of the prohibited practice, even if legal 
opinion indicates that the prohibition is likely unconstitutional. As 
such, facial challenges—especially the pre-enforcement variety—are 
necessary to avoid overdeterrence of doctors. Indeed,  
 
54 Cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 596 (noting that in some constitutional cases, “[t]he 
legal standards themselves generally call for a broader examination of social facts”). 
55 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112–18 (1976). But see Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians 
& Gynecol., 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that 
a facial challenge to a criminal abortion statute should not have been permitted). 
56 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1973) (noting that the plaintiff Jane Roe 
was no longer pregnant and that the usual pregnancy would rarely last beyond the trial phase of 
a lawsuit). 
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the fact that an abortion can only be carried out with the aid 
of a third party—typically a doctor—renders the right to 
choose an abortion particularly susceptible to a chilling 
effect. To exercise her right of choice, both the pregnant 
woman and the necessary medical personnel must have 
sufficient courage to disregard the chilling effect of potential 
state sanctions.57  
II. AYOTTE AND GONZALES 
Without paying much heed to the reasons supporting the  
widespread acceptance of facial challenges in abortion litigation, the 
Roberts Court, in two separate cases, appeared to herald the end of 
such challenges and a newfound enthusiasm for as-applied abortion 
litigation. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 
the Court vacated and remanded for a determination of whether a 
narrower remedy than total invalidation of a parental notification law 
would be appropriate.58 And in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court simply 
turned away a facial challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act while leaving the door open to an as-applied challenge.59 
This section discusses each of these cases in turn.  
Ayotte was a challenge to a New Hampshire law requiring  
physicians to notify a parent or legal guardian of any pregnant minor 
seeking an abortion at least forty-eight hours before the procedure is 
performed.60 Although parental notification laws are generally  
constitutional,61 this law was alleged to be unconstitutional because it 
lacked a health exception—an exception allowing the procedure to be 
performed without meeting the notice requirement in cases of medical 
emergency.62 Both the district court and the First Circuit Court of  
Appeals had held the law unconstitutional.  
 
57 Dorf, supra note 20, at 271 (footnote omitted). 
58 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331–32 (2006). 
59 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007). 
60 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323–24. 
61 Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422–23 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
constitutionality of Minnesota parental notification requirement for minors seeking abortions, as 
long as certain minors have the opportunity to obtain a court order allowing them to avoid the 
notification requirement); Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979) (plurality opinion) 
(holding Massachusetts’ parental consent law unconstitutional but affirming that states may 
require parental involvement in the abortion decision in certain circumstances). 
62 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 326. The plaintiffs had also challenged the New Hampshire law’s 
lack of confidentiality for minors seeking to bypass the notification requirement, but the district 
court did not rule on this claim, and therefore neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court 
addressed it. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 56–57 (2004). 
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Before the Supreme Court, the state had apparently conceded that 
“it would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that 
subjects minors to significant health risks,” thus allowing the Court to 
avoid the substantive constitutional issues.63 Instead, in a brief 
unanimous opinion,64 the Court focused primarily on the question of 
remedy and held that, while a parental notification statute may be 
unconstitutional without a health exception because it may subject at 
least some minors to serious risks to their health, it was not clearly 
necessary for the Court to invalidate the statute in its entirety.65 The 
Court therefore sent the case back to the court of appeals to decide 
whether a more “modest remedy” might be available, such as 
invalidating only the law’s unconstitutional applications.66 The Court 
noted that this inquiry turned on “legislative intent,” and therefore 
encouraged the lower court to avoid wholly invalidating a statute if 
the legislature would not have wanted that result.67 At the same time, 
the Court emphasized that legislatures should not be given an 
incentive to write overly broad statutes and leave it to the courts to 
separate the constitutional applications from the unconstitutional 
ones.68 However, the Court did not give much guidance as to how 
lower courts are to exercise their discretion or balance those 
competing considerations in crafting remedies in such cases, aside 
from its citation to a number of cases involving severance of state or 
federal statutes.69 
In Carhart v. Gonzales, the Roberts Court turned away a facial 
challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (“PBABA”), 
which outlaws a particular second-trimester abortion procedure 
known as “D&X” or “intact D&E.”70 There were two primary 
grounds of attack on the statute. The first attack was that the PBABA 
was both unconstitutionally vague and so broadly written as to sweep 
in other, more common abortion procedures (including those used 
early in pregnancy) and therefore constituted an undue burden on the 
 
63 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328. 
64 The opinion was Justice O’Connor’s last.  
65 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 330–31. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005); Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 
(1932); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 
80, 83–84 (1880); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97–98 (1879)). In the wake of the Ayotte 
decision, New Hampshire repealed the parental notification statute. 2007 N.H. Laws 265. 
70 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007). 
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abortion right.71 This was one ground on which the plaintiffs had 
prevailed in the 2000 case Stenberg v. Carhart,72 in which the 
Supreme Court struck down Nebraska’s “partial-birth” abortion 
ban.73 The second ground of attack was that the statute lacked a 
health exception allowing the procedure to be performed when 
necessary to preserve the health of th 74
Because the federal statute was more clearly aimed at one 
particular abortion procedure than the Nebraska statute that the Court 
had struck down in Stenberg, the Court rejected that basis for 
challenging the statute.75 With respect to the health exception issue, 
however, the Court did an odd thing. The statute appeared to directly 
contravene the Supreme Court’s holding in Stenberg, which stated 
that a D&X ban had to have a health exception to be constitutional.76 
Indeed, that health exception requirement had been in place since Roe 
v. Wade itself.77 In the place of a health exception, Congress had 
included in the PBABA a series of dubious factual findings, declaring 
that a health exception was unnecessary and that the courts were 
required to defer to its factual findings.78 The Court in Gonzales 
nonetheless upheld the statute against a facial challenge, largely 
because in the Court’s view there was a dispute of medical fact over 
whether a health exception is necessary in a D&X ban—that is, 
whether the procedure is ever medically necessary.79 Moreover, while 
the Court noted that it normally defers to legislative judgment on 
disputed questions of scientific fact, in this case it had reason to doubt 
the quality of Congress’s factfinding (such as the fact that many of 
those found “facts” were demonstrably false), and so it declined to 
defer to—or at least to place “dispositive weight” on—Congress’s 
findings.80 It nonetheless asserted that factual disputes—such as the 
dispute over the circumstances, if any, in which D&X is medically 
required to avoid serious health risks—are best worked out in the 
 
71 Id. at 146–47, 150. 
72 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
73 Id. at 939–40. 
74 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161. The statute did contain a life exception, allowing life-saving 
abortions. Id. at 141–42 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006)). 
75 Id. at 147–56. 
76 Id. at 166 (citing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938). 
77 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (holding that, post-viability, “the State . . . may . . . 
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”). 
78 Congressional Findings (5)–(14), in notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp. 
IV), p. 769. 
79 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is 
uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health, 
given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”). 
80 Id. at 165. 
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context of an as-applied challenge, not a facial challenge, and 
primarily for that reason the Court turned away the facial challenge.81 
The Court’s decision in Gonzales was  
surprising in a number of respects, but for purposes of this essay, I 
shall describe only a few of them. First, based on a record that was no 
less favorable to the plaintiffs than the record before the Court in 
Stenberg, the Supreme Court reached an essentially opposite result; 
yet it never claimed to be overruling Stenberg.82 The only meaningful 
differences between the facts of Stenberg and Gonzales are that, in 
Gonzales, there were explicit factual findings to support the 
Government’s view, as opposed to mere state legislative history 
supporting the state’s view in Stenberg, and that Gonzales dealt with 
a federal statute, whereas Stenberg dealt with a state statute.83 But the 
Gonzales Court made it fairly clear that neither of these differences 
accounted for the differing results; instead, the Court disavowed the 
notion that any necessity of deferring to explicit legislative findings 
of fact played a dispositive role in its decision.84 Indeed, the Court 
went so far as to assert that it “retains an independent constitutional 
duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at 
stake.”85 Moreover, the Court did not suggest that federalism 
concerns—such as a desire to defer more to Congress, a coordinate 
branch of the federal government, than to state legislatures—played 
any role in its differing treatment of the two statutes.86  
Yet, in the end, the Court turned away a facial challenge in a case 
almost identical to one in which the Court had previously 
emphatically sustained one. It seems that the only way to understand 
the Court’s decision to reject a facial challenge in Gonzales that it had 
embraced in Stenberg comes from Ayotte, in which the Court 
observed that “the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and [the Court] 
did not contemplate, relief more finely drawn.”87 In other words, the 
 
81 Id. at 167. 
82 Id. at 177–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the evidence before the trial courts 
in the cases at bar and noting the “undisguised conflict with Stenberg”).  
83 Id. at 132 (majority op.); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).  
84 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165–66 (stating that “[u]ncritical deference to Congress’ factual 
findings . . . is inappropriate” and that the Court would not place “dispositive weight” on them). 
85 Id. at 165 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)). 
86 Some commentators have observed that, in general, the Roberts Court does not seem as 
interested in or sympathetic to federalism concerns as the Rehnquist Court was. See, e.g., David 
Franklin, The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election & the Future of the Judiciary, 6 DEPAUL BUS. 
& COMM. L.J. 513, 518–20 (2008); Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts 
Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 30–31 
(2006). 
87 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006). At least one 
commentator has suggested that the disjunction between the results in Gonzales and Stenberg 
suggests that the Court is using its stated preference for as-applied adjudication strategically, in 
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Government in Gonzales, unlike the State of Nebraska in Stenberg, 
requested, inter alia, a more limited remedy than facial invalidation.88 
The Court thus suggested that it would have granted a more limited 
remedy in Stenberg if the state had asked for it. 
A second unusual feature of the Supreme Court’s decision is that it 
left the door open to a “preenforcement, as-applied challenge[]” to the 
PBABA.89 In such a challenge, the Court explained, plaintiffs would 
have to show that “in discrete and well-defined instances a particular 
condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited 
by the Act must be used.”90 The Court suggested that in such a 
context, “the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and 
balanced than in a facial attack.”91 The Court’s statement almost 
certainly assumes that, as in Stenberg and Gonzales, the challenge 
would be brought by abortion providers asserting third-party standing 
on behalf of their patients, since it is hard to imagine any individual 
woman who would have standing to bring such a challenge, much 
less the desire to do so. In order to have standing, the woman would 
presumably have to argue that she was going to become pregnant and 
face a health-threatening (but not life-threatening) condition that 
required use of the D&X procedure in particular. What is strange 
about the Court’s openness to a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge 
in such a case, then, is that the challenge would be functionally 
identical to what the plaintiffs in Gonzales in fact did. As Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, “the record already include[d] 
hundreds and hundreds of pages of testimony identifying ‘discrete 
and well-defined instances’ in which recourse to an intact D & E 
would better protect the health of women with particular 
conditions.”92 The existence of such conditions was one of the 
principal issues around which the three lengthy bench trials on the 
constitutionality of the PBABA turned.93 
 
 
order to avoid precedent with which it disagrees. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774, 800. 
88 Brief for the Petitioners, Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380, 05-1382), 2006 WL 
228212, at 40-47; Brief for Petitioner, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. (No. 04-
1144), 2005 WL 1920929, at 43-46; Brief of Petitioners, Stenberg v. Carhart (No. 99-830), 2000 
WL 228615. 
89 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 189–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 161–63 (majority op.) (reciting lower court evidence pertaining to the safety and 
medical necessity of intact D&E). Indeed, one commentator has referred to the Court’s allusion 
to a future as-applied challenge as a “[f]alse [p]romise.” Borgmann, supra note 17, at 593. 
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*     *    *    * 
In both Ayotte and Gonzales, the Court talked the talk of judicial 
modesty when declining to uphold facial invalidations. In Ayotte, the 
Court described more limited invalidation of the New Hampshire law 
as “narrow” and “modest” but also expressed concern for the  
limitations of both its “constitutional mandate and institutional  
competence” should it wade too far into the task of re-writing a state 
statute.94 In Gonzales, the Court similarly expressed concern about its 
“obligation [and] institutional role” if it were to “resolve questions of 
constitutionality with respect to . . . ‘every conceivable situation 
which might possibly arise in the application of complex and 
comprehensive legislation.’”95 I nonetheless argue, in the remainder 
of this essay, that there is almost nothing modest about what the Court 
did in Ayotte and Gonzales. On the contrary, those decisions threaten 
separation of powers, require judges to remain embroiled in the 
abortion controversy and decide issues arguably well beyond their  
competency, and—even more dramatically—appear to be a step  
toward reshaping a major facet of abortion jurisprudence that has 
been in place since Roe v. Wade—namely, the health exception. 
III. AN IMMODEST MODESTY 
Before explaining the ways in which the Court’s decisions in  
Ayotte and Gonzales were far more radical than modest in their future 
implications, I wish first to set out my view of the Court’s actual 
intention in Gonzales, and particularly of its decision to turn away a 
facial challenge while accepting the possibility of a future  
pre-enforcement as-applied challenge. I believe that Gonzales can 
only be understood in light of Ayotte as an attempt to finish what  
Ayotte started. Since the Court in Gonzales accepted the future  
possibility of an as-applied challenge that would be the same in  
virtually all respects as the facial challenge it rejected, it seems that it 
must have been ultimately concerned neither with the way in which 
the challenge to the PBABA was structured nor with the kind of 
evidence presented to the lower courts but rather with the remedy the 
plaintiffs ultimately achieved. Had the Court in Gonzales wanted to 
require that future challenges to abortion regulations be brought by 
individual women currently seeking the procedure—a requirement 
that would essentially mean the end of, or at least a sharp reduction 
 
94 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 331 (2006). 
95 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)). 
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in, constitutional challenges to abortion restrictions96—it certainly 
would not have spoken in terms of “pre-enforcement” as-applied 
challenges. Rather, it must have assumed that a future pre-
enforcement as-applied challenge would very much resemble the 
challenge currently before the Court but that—as in Ayotte—the 
remedy would not be facial invalidation.  
Of course, the Court’s decision to reject the constitutional 
challenge altogether in Gonzales, rather than to remand the cases for 
the lower courts to shape a more precise remedy, was puzzling.97 But 
this decision could be understood either as a political move—so that 
the Court was not seen as agreeing with the lower courts’ decision to 
strike down the PBABA98—or as an attempt to send a particularly 
strong message to future plaintiffs that they must not, in the future, 
seek facial invalidation of abortion regulations whose only flaw is the 
lack of a health exception. In other words, the Court established in 
Ayotte that a more limited remedy than facial invalidation was 
appropriate in health-exception cases; in Gonzales, it made good on 
that claim by demonstrating that in the future, inappropriate facial 
challenges could properly be turned away, without an opportunity for 
the plaintiffs to seek their second-choice form of relief—partial 
invalidation. 
This section therefore proceeds on the assumption that the primary 
significance of the Court’s decision to turn away the facial challenge 
in Gonzales has to do with the shape and scope of the injunction 
against enforcement of the law that district courts will have to issue in 
 
96 See id. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Surely the Court cannot mean that no suit 
may be brought until a woman’s health is immediately jeopardized by the ban on intact D&E. A 
woman ‘suffer[ing] from medical complications’ needs access to the medical procedure at once 
and cannot wait for the judicial process to unfold.” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). 
Some challenges to restrictive abortion policies do continue to be brought by individual women 
seeking abortions, particularly in the prison context. See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 
(8th Cir.) (upholding a challenge by an inmate to a corrections department policy of essentially 
prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions for prisoners), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 109 (2008); Victoria 
W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an individual inmate’s challenge to a 
prison policy requiring inmates to get a court order before obtaining nontherapeutic abortions). 
As discussed above, however, most challenges are by clinics or physicians or both. 
97 Cf. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court does not 
“explain why the injunctions ordered by the District Courts should not remain in place, trimmed 
only to exclude instances in which another procedure would safeguard a woman’s health at least 
equally well”); see also Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, and Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 611, 618–19 (2009) (noting that “[i]f total invalidation of the federal ban seemed 
too sweeping for the Court, it could have followed the approach taken in Ayotte and remanded 
for consideration of a more limited injunction”). 
98 Cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774 (suggesting that the Roberts Court has shown a 
preference for as-applied litigation and turned away facial challenges in some instances 
strategically, as a way of avoiding precedent with which the Court disagrees). 
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future abortion cases.99 This conclusion roughly accords with the 
views of the few lower courts that have dealt with challenges to  
abortion statutes that lack health exceptions in the wake of Ayotte and 
Gonzales.100 Moreover, this understanding should not come as a  
surprise, given that many commentators have observed that the  
doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges is primarily a doctrine 
concerning remedies.101 Nonetheless, I argue in this final section that 
none of the pronounced rationales for preferring as-applied litigation 
over facial challenges justifies the Court’s approach in Ayotte and 
Gonzales and that the Court has not only put modesty aside but also 
threatened to radically reshape substantive abortion doctrine with its 
decisions in those cases. 
First, to the extent that the Court’s desire not to nullify more of a 
law than is absolutely necessary indicates solicitude for legislative 
prerogative and legislative intent, it must be acknowledged that  
this solicitude is not necessarily well served by a preference for 
partial invalidation of state laws. Indeed, shifting the focus of  
health-exception jurisprudence from constitutional doctrine to the 
issue of remedy instead encourages federal courts to exercise  
enormous discretion and to make judgments about legislators’ intent 
in a highly unguided way. As David Gans has recently pointed out, 
severability doctrine confers on judges the responsibility of  
“[a]ggressive [j]udicial [l]awmaking,” especially since “[l]egislative 
 
99 Professor Michael Dorf seems to reject this understanding of Gonzales, as he suggests 
that reading the case to take seriously the possibility of future pre-enforcement as-applied 
challenges by doctors asserting the rights of their patients under a theory of third-party standing 
would mean “that exception swallows the holding of the case.” Michael C. Dorf, Abortion 
Rights, 23 TOURO L. REV. 815, 825 (2008). 
100 In neither Ayotte nor Gonzales have the parties litigated the scope of the injunction to a 
final conclusion after remand. Only two federal appellate cases have grappled significantly with 
the impact of Gonzales’ and Ayotte’s holdings with respect to facial challenges. In Northland 
Family Planning Clinic. Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit observed  
Gonzales appeared to suggest that “facial challenges are not the preferred mechanism for  
challenges pertaining to health exceptions to prohibitions on the D & X procedure,” but that the 
scope of Gonzales’ applicability was unclear in the case at bar. Id. at 340. It then discussed 
Ayotte when deciding on the scope of the injunction to be issued against Michigan’s Legal Birth 
Definition Act and held that the Act could nonetheless be enjoined in its entirety because it was 
broad enough to sweep other procedures besides D&X within its prohibitions. Id. at 333–37. 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128 
(4th Cir. 2008), vacated, 570 F.3d 165 (2009) (en banc), asserted that Gonzales did not 
“question the established validity of facial challenges to abortion statutes” outside the health-
exception context, and then cited Ayotte in the course of determining the extent of the proper 
injunction invalidating Virginia’s “Partial Birth Infanticide” Act. Id. at 146, 149. The 
subsequent opinion by the en banc Fourth Circuit followed the route of Gonzales more closely, 
however, in determining that the plaintiff’s facial challenge would fail and that his as-applied 
challenge “cannot be addressed” due to the lack of factual record. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 
F.3d at 180. 
101 Metzger, supra note 4, at 791–92 & nn.77–78 (citing sources). 
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intent, as a test, does little to constrain courts from using severability  
doctrine to rewrite statues in substantial fashion.”102 Determinations 
of legislative intent, after all, are both difficult and extremely 
malleable, and they often must be reached without reliable guideposts 
from the legislature itself. Thus, the effect of the Roberts Court’s 
decisions in Ayotte and Gonzales is that parties will have to fight over 
the appropriate scope of an injunction against an unconstitutional 
abortion regulation and over what the legislature would have wanted, 
with no real standards for making that judgment, and in a highly 
politicized arena.  
Second, the Court has not actually encouraged any more fact-
finding by the lower courts before ruling on the constitutionality of 
abortion restrictions or ensured that concrete fact scenarios will be  
before those courts in the future. Indeed, Gonzales contemplates  
the continuing availability of pre-enforcement as-applied challenges 
in the abortion context and did not appear to question the validity  
of third-party standing in those cases.103 As noted above, future  
as-applied challenges to abortion restrictions will presumably  
be functionally identical to the facial challenges before the Court  
in Ayotte and Gonzales; the only difference will be in the  
remedy obtained. Thus, the Court has not served the purpose that 
purportedly drove its decision to turn away the facial challenge in 
Gonzales—deciding the case based on a concrete fact scenario. 
Indeed, it does not appear that the Roberts Court’s decisions will 
prevent unnecessary constitutional adjudication in any respect. In 
fact, these decisions potentially require courts to decide even more 
constitutional questions than they already do in the abortion area and 
to address problems that they most likely lack the competence to 
resolve. For example, if the landscape created by Ayotte and Gonzales 
is such that future challenges to abortion restrictions—for example on 
the ground that those restrictions lack a health exception—will have 
to be as-applied challenges seeking limited invalidation of the law, 
then parties to those lawsuits will begin spending considerable time 
and resources fighting over the scope of the injunction to be issued by 
the district court. If the law is unconstitutional as applied, the key 
question will become, “As applied to whom?”  
 
102 David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 663, 
669 (2008). 
103 Cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 592–93 (arguing that “[r]equiring evidence of actual 
harm in a challenge to a rights-infringing law defeats the very purpose of a pre-enforcement 
challenge” and may be “morally troubling” in some cases). 
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given absolutely no 
guidance as to how lower courts should answer that question.104 If 
plaintiffs were to mount a successful pre-enforcement as-applied 
challenge based on the federal PBABA’s lack of an exception for 
women who need the procedure for medical reasons, would the 
district court then be expected to enjoin the statute only when the 
procedure is “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,” to avoid 
“significant health risks” to the woman?105 Or would the injunction 
instead carve out specific, enumerated medical conditions that, if 
present, would prevent application of the statute?106 Would a district 
court overstep its bounds if, following Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion, 
it issued an injunction barring the law’s enforcement in its entirety 
except where the procedure lacks any health benefit that makes it 
superior to other procedures?107 As should be apparent from these 
examples, it is doubtful that judges possess the competency to make 
the sort of medical decisions that are called for by such a scheme.108 
And it does not take much imagination to believe that those 
injunctions might then be appealed as unconstitutionally narrow or 
excessively broad, thus requiring further constitutional line-drawing 
in this area. 
Lurking behind these somewhat technical objections to the Court’s 
decision to shift the focus of abortion jurisprudence to the problem of 
remedies is a broader, more fundamental concern about the effect of 
Ayotte and Gonzales on the future of the health exception. It seems 
that the Court has effectively re-opened the issue of the meaning and 
 
104 See Manian, supra note 97, at 619–20. 
105 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood 
of N. New Eng.¸ 546 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2006); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 879–80 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 See id. at 167 (stating that a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge “is the proper manner 
to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances 
a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act 
must be used” (emphasis added)); Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331 (“Only a few applications of New 
Hampshire’s parental notification statute would present a constitutional problem. So long as 
they are faithful to legislative intent, then, in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory 
judgment and an injunction prohibiting the statute’s unconstitutional application.”). 
107 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lower court’s 
injunction should have been “trimmed only to exclude instances in which another procedure 
would safeguard a woman's health at least equally well”). 
108 Cf. Manian, supra note 97, at 622 (“Normally, we leave to the attending physician’s 
judgment the determination of what is medically necessary . . . . Judges lack the medical 
training to second-guess a treating physician’s medical judgment [in an individual case].”). I 
have argued elsewhere that courts are more competent than legislators to decide disputed issues 
of medical fact. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 332–41 (2007). I continue to believe 
this is true, as a matter of comparative competence, but I doubt that either legislators or federal 
judges are as well-qualified as physicians, in conjunction with their patients, to make medical 
treatment decisions. 
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scope of the health exception requirement itself in two important 
respects. First, it is widely accepted that the importance, and therefore 
the degree of protection, accorded to a particular constitutional 
right—what Professor Daryl Levinson has called the “cash value” of 
a right—“is a function of the remedial consequences attached to its 
violation.”109 Thus, one might argue that the Supreme Court has 
essentially cheapened the abortion right by taking facial invalidation 
off the table as a possible remedy for unconstitutional abortion 
laws—or at least those that lack a health exception.110 The 
consequences of this cheapening are both real and meaningful, since 
in some instances—the PBABA cases presumably being one—the 
game will no longer be worth the candle and constitutional challenges 
simply will not be brought.111 Thus, contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s 
prediction,112 no as-applied challenges to the federal D&X ban have 
been filed in the wake of the Court’s decision in Gonzales. 
But perhaps even more profoundly, the Supreme Court has opened 
the door to deciding questions that have long gone unanswered in its 
jurisprudence—most likely for good reason. Since the Supreme 
Court’s vague suggestion in Doe v. Bolton,113 the companion case to 
Roe v. Wade, that the word “health” in the abortion context should be 
understood broadly, “in the light of all factors—physical, emotional,  
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the  
well-being of the patient” and in accordance with the physician’s 
“best medical judgment,” the Supreme Court has avoided defining  
or limiting the contours of the constitutionally required health  
exception.114 Instead, the Supreme Court has simply mandated a 
health exception, with lower courts following suit. Legislatures, for 
their part, have generally included in their abortion regulations health 
exceptions that are sufficiently broad and general to avoid being 
challenged, usually by adopting some version of the “medical 
judgment” language of Roe and Doe.115 Presumably, legislators knew 
 
109 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 874 (1999). 
110 Cf. Hartnett, supra note 3, at 1756–57 (noting that facial challenges “raise the stakes” of 
constitutional litigation and suggesting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ayotte indicates a 
desire to “lower[] the stakes in a time of transition” while awaiting Justice O’Connor’s 
successor to the Court). 
111 Cf. David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional 
Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, (2009) (predicting that few as-applied challenges will be brought 
to future abortion regulations based on the lack of a health exception “not because they are 
without merit, but because the structural impediments are too great”). 
112 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
113 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
114 Id. at 192. 
115 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §390.01114(2)(d), (3)(b) (requiring parental notice for 
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that to omit or tinker with the health exception meant risking 
invalidation of the entire abortion regulation and having to start over 
from scratch.116 This state of affairs essentially created and preserved 
a large realm of discretion for physicians, rather than courts or 
legislatures, to decide when an abortion, or a particular abortion 
procedure, was medically appropriate. Indeed, this right could even 
be characterized as a separate right from the right to procreative 
choice—it more closely resembles a right to protect one’s health 
through seeking appropriate medical treatment.117  
Now, by opening up the health exception to specification—and 
even requiring specification of its meaning and scope—the Court has 
arguably changed the actual nature of the right.118 The remedial tail, 
 
 
abortions performed on minors, except, inter alia, if “In the physician's good faith clinical 
judgment, a medical emergency exists and there is insufficient time for the attending physician 
to comply with the notification requirements” and in turn defining “medical emergency” in 
terms of the “physician's good faith clinical judgment”); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(i) (creating an 
exception to the requirement of parental consent for minors seeking abortions “where there is an 
emergency need for a medical procedure to be performed such that continuation of the 
pregnancy provides an immediate threat and grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant 
woman and the attending physician so certifies in writing”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2317.56(A)(2) (West 2004) (requiring certain information be given to the woman before an 
abortion is performed, unless there is a medical condition “that, in the reasonable judgment of 
the physician who is attending the woman, so complicates the pregnancy that it necessitates the 
immediate performance or inducement of an abortion”). There have been a few pre-Gonzales 
challenges to statutes on the ground that the health exceptions are unconstitutionally narrow. See 
Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908. 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
unconstitutional a law requiring parental consent for minors seeking abortions except in the case 
of “a sudden and unexpected physical condition which, in the reasonable medical judgment of 
any ordinarily prudent physician acting under the circumstances and conditions then existing, is 
abnormal and so complicates the medical condition of the pregnant minor as to necessitate the 
immediate causing or performing of an abortion.”); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 
F.3d 436, 440, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding against constitutional challenge a health 
exception that allowed the D&X procedure only when “necessary, in reasonable medical 
judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother’s life or health 
being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major 
bodily function” (emphasis added)).  
116 See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 1756 (noting that “facial challenges raise the stakes” of 
litigation). 
117 Elsewhere, I have argued extensively that such a right exists, though its recognition has 
not been consistent outside the abortion context. See Hill, supra note 108; see also John A. 
Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to Health Care, HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 15, 15 (arguing that a negative right to health care “anchors a 
woman’s use of abortion and contraception, and underlies the great deference ordinarily 
accorded doctors and patients to pursue medical care”); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, 
Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1824 
(2007) (inferring that the abortion cases recognize a constitutional “right to defend oneself using 
medical care”). 
118 Cf. Levinson, supra note 109, at 873 (discussing the concept of “remedial 
equilibration,” which holds that “constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, 
remedial concerns”). But see, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional 
Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723, 749–53 (1979) (giving 
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in other words, has started to wag the substantive doctrinal dog. 
Instead of simply delegating medical decisions to physicians, both 
legislators and courts will be asked to determine the meaning of 
medical necessity, resulting in narrower and possibly inconsistent 
definitions of it. The scope of the injunction in each particular case, 
usually crafted by the district court based on the evidence before it, 
will now determine the scope of the constitutional right of women to 
protect their health with a medically necessary abortion. That 
injunction may be broader or narrower in some geographic areas or 
types of cases than in others. It would be an understatement to say 
that this result is in tension with the prior state of affairs, according to 
which the patient’s constitutional right to a medically necessary 
abortion was sacrosanct and the appropriate choice of treatment was 
left to the woman and her physician to decide. 
Not only is this revised constitutional doctrine troubling from the 
perspective of the women whose health may be put at risk while the 
“new” meaning of the constitutionally required health exception is 
worked out, it is troubling from the perspective of judicial modesty. It 
appears that the Roberts Court has sub silentio overturned prior 
substantive precedent pertaining to the health exception, while 
leaving enormous doubt as to what must take its place.119 It has thus 
likely embroiled the lower federal courts in decisions about the scope 
and meaning of the health exception for years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
A reader who is more sympathetic to the ideological leanings of 
the newest Justices of the Roberts Court might claim that it is only 
sensible to require more limited invalidation of laws regulating 
abortion as a means of halting the “‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that 
the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of  
constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.”120 
Indeed, one might argue that facial invalidation was far too powerful 
medicine for a statute whose only ailment was the lack of a health 
exception, and that the Supreme Court’s approach in Ayotte and 
 
 
examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has issued narrow remedial rulings out of 
federalism concerns without correspondingly narrowing the underlying constitutional rights).  
119 Cf. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“[I]t is not apparent how and whether Gonzales diminishes the rule requiring an exception to 
protect the woman’s life that does not impose upon her an increased medical risk.”). 
120 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 3/24/2009 9:39:56 PM 
26 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:4 
                                                                                                                 
Gonzales merely restores a healthy state of affairs to constitutional 
remedies doctrine.121  
Although an evaluation of the substantive merits of that view is 
beyond the scope of this essay, I find the Court’s approach in Ayotte 
and Gonzales to be unwise. I believe that it may subject some women 
to significant health risks and lead to poor decisionmaking about 
important medical issues. In any case, whether wise or foolish, the 
Roberts Court’s decisions in those cases are anything but modest. 
They herald potentially radical changes to substantive constitutional 
doctrine under the guise of judicial restraint. 
 
121 See, e.g., Collett, supra note 2, at 732. 
